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The rise of molecular epigenetics over the last few years promises to bring the discourse
about the sociality and susceptibility to environmental influences of the brain to an
entirely new level. Epigenetics deals with molecular mechanisms such as gene expression,
which may embed in the organism “memories” of social experiences and environmental
exposures. These changes in gene expression may be transmitted across generations
without changes in the DNA sequence. Epigenetics is the most advanced example of
the new postgenomic and context-dependent view of the gene that is making its way into
contemporary biology. In my article I will use the current emergence of epigenetics and its
link with neuroscience research as an example of the new, and in a way unprecedented,
sociality of contemporary biology. After a review of the most important developments
of epigenetic research, and some of its links with neuroscience, in the second part
I reflect on the novel challenges that epigenetics presents for the social sciences for a
re-conceptualization of the link between the biological and the social in a postgenomic age.
Although epigenetics remains a contested, hyped, and often uncritical terrain, I claim that
especially when conceptualized in broader non-genecentric frameworks, it has a genuine
potential to reformulate the ossified biology/society debate.
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AFTER GENE-CENTRISM: THE NEW SOCIAL BIOLOGY
Profound conceptual novelties have interested the life-sciences
in the last three decades. In several disciplines, from neuro-
science to genetics, we have witnessed a growing (and parallel)
crisis of models that tended to sever biological factors from
social/environmental ones. This possibility of disentangling neatly
what seemed to belong to the “biological” from the “environ-
mental” and to attribute a sort of causal primacy to biological
factors (equated with genetic) in opposition to social or cultural
ones (thought of as being more superficial, or appearing later
in the ontology of development) was part and parcel of very
vocal research-programs in the 1990s. These programs were all
more or less heirs of the gene-centrism of sociobiology: from
evolutionary psychology, to a powerful nativism that was very
influential in psychology and cognitive neuroscience with its
obsessive emphasis on hardwiring culture or morality into the
brain.
These programs have always received a barrage of criti-
cisms from several intellectual traditions (Griffiths, 2009; Meloni,
2013a), particularly those with roots in ethology (Lehrman, 1953,
1970; Bateson, 1991; Bateson and Martin, 1999), and devel-
opmental biology (West and King, 1987; Griffiths and Gray,
1994; Gottlieb, 1997; Oyama, 2000a[1985],b; Oyama et al., 2001;
Griffiths, 2002; Moore, 2003). However, never as in this last
decade, we have had scientific evidence that the dichotomous
view of biology vs. society and biology vs. culture is biologically
fallacious (Meaney, 2001a).
Paradoxically, it was exactly the completion of the Human
Genome Project that showed that the view of the gene as a discrete
and autonomous agent powerfully leading traits and developmen-
tal processes is more of a fantasy than actually being founded on
scientific evidence, as highlighted by the “missing heritability”
case (Maher, 2008). The image of a distinct, particulate gene
marked by “clearly defined boundaries” and performing just one
job, i.e., coding for proteins, has been overturned in recent years
(Griffiths and Stotz, 2013: 68; see also Barnes and Dupré, 2008;
Keller, 2011). Although discussions are far from being settled, the
work of the ENCODE consortium for instance has been crucial
in showing the important regulatory functions of what, in a
narrow “gene-centric view”, was supposed to be mere “junk DNA”
(Encode, 2007, 2012; Pennisi, 2012). Not only does a very small
percentage of the genome (less than 2%) act according to the
classical definition of the gene as a protein-coding sequence, but
most of the non-protein coding DNA in fact plays an important
regulatory function. The genome is therefore today best described
as a “vast reactive system” (Keller, 2011) embedded in a complex
regulatory network with distributed specificity (Griffiths and
Stotz, 2013). An important part of this regulatory network is
involved in responding to environmental signals, which can cover
a very broad range of phenomena, from the cellular environment
around the DNA, to the entire organism and, in the case of human
beings, their social and cultural dynamics.
To sum up a decade of empirical and conceptual novelties
the conceptualization of the gene has become dynamic and
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“perspectival” (Moss, 2003), in what can be called the new
“postgenomic view1”; it addresses genes as part of a broader regu-
lative context, “embedded inside cells and their complex chemical
environments” that are, in turn, embedded in organs, systems and
societies (Lewkowicz, 2010). Genes are now seen as “catalysts”
more than “codes” in development (Elman et al., 1996), “fol-
lowers” rather than “leaders” in evolution (West-Eberhard, 2003;
Robert, 2004). The more genetic research has gone forward, the
more genomes are seen to “respond in a flexible manner to signals
from a massive regulatory architecture that is, increasingly, the
real focus of research in ‘genetics’” (Griffiths and Stotz, 2013: 2;
see also Barnes and Dupré, 2008; Dupré, 2012).
As Michael Meaney (2001a: 52, 58) wrote more than a decade
ago: “There are no genetic factors that can be studied indepen-
dently of the environment, and there are no environmental factors
that function independently of the genome. . . . At no point in
life is the operation of the genome independent of the context in
which it functions.” Moreover, “environmental events occurring
at a later stage of development . . . can alter a developmental
trajectory” making meaningless any linear regression studies of
nature and nurture. Genes are always “genes in context”, “context-
dependent catalysts of cellular changes, rather “controllers” of
developmental progress and direction” (Nijhout, 1990: 444),
susceptible to be reversed in their expression by individual’s
experiences during development (Champagne and Mashoodh,
2009).
EPIGENETICS
The recent surge of interest in molecular epigenetics is probably
the most visible example of these conceptual changes in con-
temporary biology. After a delay of almost fifty years from its
coining, epigenetics has become a “buzzword” in XXI century
biology (Jablonka and Raz, 2009: 131): the vertical growth of
publications in the field in the last decade certifies this epidemic of
epigenetics (Haig, 2012; Jirtle, 2012). It is far from my intention
to oversell the conceptual and evidential strength of a discipline
still as embryonic, multiple, and contested as molecular epige-
netics. Many things in epigenetics remain highly controversial
and debated, and cautiousness in dealing with its relevance,
especially for humans, remains a good scientific policy (Feil and
Fraga, 2012). Moreover, the notion of epigenetics is elusive and
plastic, meaning different things for different research contexts
(Morange, 2002; Bird, 2007; Ptashne, 2007; Dupré, 2012; Griffiths
and Stotz, 2013). Despite (or, more likely, just because of) this
semantic ambiguity epigenetics prospers as a scientific and social
phenomenon in need of careful reflective scrutiny (Meloni and
Testa, in press).
Also, the genealogy of epigenetics in biological thought is
complex, and its current molecular “crystallization” is the result
1Here postgenomics has to be understood in a twofold meaning: chronolog-
ically it refers to what has happened after the deciphering of the Human
Genome in 2003; epistemologically it illustrates the emergence of a number of
gaps in knowledge and unforeseen complexities surrounding the gene that has
led to the current contextual conceptualization of the genome as affected by
environmental signals and part of a broader regulative architecture (Dupré,
2012; Griffiths and Stotz, 2013). It is particularly this latter meaning that is
central here.
of a series of important conceptual shifts (Jablonka and Lamb,
2002; Haig, 2012; Griffiths and Stotz, 2013). The notion was
firstly coined by embryologist and developmental biologist C.
H. Waddington (1905–1975) in the 1940s as a neologism from
epigenesis to define, in a broader non-molecular sense, the “whole
complex of developmental processes” that connects genotype and
phenotype (reprinted in Waddington, 2012). For Waddington
epigenetics was “the branch of biology which studies the causal
interactions between genes and their products which bring the
phenotype into being” (Waddington, 1968 see Jablonka and
Lamb, 2002).
A parallel origin of the concept is having probably a stronger
influence on the present understanding of epigenetics. This latter
tradition originates with Nanney’s (1958) paper in Epigenetic
Control Systems, and refers more specifically to the existence of a
second non-genetic system, at the cellular level, that regulates gene
expression (Nanney, 1958; see, Haig, 2004; Griffiths and Stotz,
2013).
It is this second narrower molecular meaning that is becoming
increasingly influential in the contemporary literature (Griffiths
and Stotz, 2013). This is why it is probably more correct to
call contemporary epigenetics “molecular epigenetics” to dif-
ferentiate it from the broader Waddingtonian sense and the
developmentalist-embryological tradition in which the term was
firstly conceived, although it is true that the two meanings are
not in principle irreconcilable as they both emphasize the context
(molecular or at the level of the organism) where genetic func-
tioning takes place (Hallgrímsson and Hall, 2011).
In the present mainstream molecular sense, a rather standard
and very often quoted definition of “epigenetics” is “the study of
mitotically and/or meiotically heritable changes in gene function
that cannot be explained by changes in DNA sequence” (my italics,
Russo et al., 1996, quoted in Bird, 2007: 396; see also Feng and
Fan, 2009). This definition in a negative form is pretty typical even
in less technical books, where we find epigenetics called as the
study of all the “long-term alterations of DNA that don’t involve
changes in the DNA sequence itself ” (Francis, 2011: X, my italics).
In a broader but still negative form, epigenetics can be defined
as any “phenotypic variation that is not attributable to genetic
variation” (Haig, 2012: 15, my italics). If we search for an oper-
ationally positive definition (more rare), we can call molecular
epigenetics “the active perpetuation of local chromatin states”
(Bird and Macleod, 2004 quoted in Richards, 2006: 395) or the
self-perpetuation of gene expression “in the absence of the orig-
inal signal that caused them” (Dulac, 2010: 729). The preferred
recourse to a negative definition not only reflects the uncertainty
surrounding the range and stability of epigenetic mutations, but
more importantly it makes evident the difficulties of conceptu-
alizing epigenetics in a way that might finally go beyond a gene-
centric view of heredity and phenotypic development2.
DNA methylation, the addition of a methyl group to a DNA
base that can silence gene expression, is the most well-known
example of an epigenetic modification. Given its crucial function
as regulator of gene expression, methylation has been defined
as the “prima donna” of epigenetics (Santos, quoted in Sweatt,
2I thank one of the two anonymous reviewers for bringing this to my attention.
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2013). Other possible examples of epigenetic marks include his-
tone modifications, alterations of chromatin structure, and gene
regulation by non-coding RNA.
In evolutionary terms, epigenetic changes, far from being a
biological anomaly, are fundamental for developmental plastic-
ity, the “intermediate process” by which a “fixed genome” can
respond in a dynamic way to the solicitations from a changing
environment, and produce different phenotypes from a single
genome (Meaney and Szyf, 2005; cfr. also Robert, 2004; Gluckman
et al., 2009, 2011). Recent studies (Kucharski et al., 2008; Lyko
et al., 2010) on the impact of DNA methylation on the develop-
ment of different phenotypes between sterile worker and fertile
queen honeybees (Apis mellifera) have shown the importance of
epigenetic changes (via different nutrition in this case) on the
mechanism underlying developmental plasticity.
Even more interestingly, these changes in gene expression (and
the phenotypic alteration that results from it) have a twofold
property whose importance in rethinking the nexus of biology
and social factors cannot be underestimated: (1) some epige-
netic modifications, like DNA methylation, can be maintained
throughout life whereas others are susceptible to change even later
in life being therefore reversible under certain circumstances; and
(2) some epigenetic states, against established wisdom, appear to
be transmissible inter-generationally.
Point 2 especially remains very controversial because received
wisdom is that these epigenetic marks are reset at each generation
and therefore incapable of offering the required stability to sustain
transgenerational phenotypic changes. It is true that the issue
of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance remains the source
of more questions than answers so far (Daxinger and Whitelaw,
2010), but novel and interesting studies are challenging the estab-
lished view of inheritance (Anway et al., 2005; Rassoulzadegan
et al., 2006; Hitchins, 2007; Wagner et al., 2008; Franklin et al.,
2010; Saavedra-Rodriguez and Feig, 2013) and pointing at the
transgenerational effects on future generations (up to four) of
environmental effects via epigenetic mechanisms in the two alter-
native forms of: (a) germline epigenetic inheritance (where the
epigenetic mark is directly transmitted, see for instance Anway
et al. (2005); and (b) experience-dependent non-germline epi-
genetic inheritance (where the epigenetic mark is recreated in
each successive generation by the re-occurrence of the induc-
ing behavior, or “niche recreation”: Champagne, 2008, 2013a,b;
Champagne and Curley, 2008; Danchin et al., 2011; Gluckman
et al., 2011).
Possible examples of these latter indirect or non germline epi-
genetic phenomena in humans include the often quoted research
on transgenerational effects on chronic disease in individuals
prenatally exposed to famine during the Dutch Hunger Winter
in 1944–45 (Heijmans et al., 2008; Painter et al., 2008; Veenendaal
et al., 2013). In the context of the growing interest in the develop-
mental origins of chronic noncommunicable disease in humans
(the so-called “developmental origins of health and disease”,
DOHaD), epigenetic research is bringing to light how, during
particularly plastic phases of development, environmental cues
(for instance, in the above quoted example, levels of nutrition)
set up stable epigenetic markers that shape (or “program”) the
organism’s later susceptibility to disease (Gluckman et al., 2011).
In a broader evolutionary perspective, epigenetic marks, and
DNA methylation in particular, are becoming recognized as
“candidate mechanisms” (Kappeler and Meaney, 2010; see also
Danchin et al., 2011) for parental effects, the phenomenon
whereby exposures in one generation to certain environmental
states (for instance in this case, famine) can affect the next gen-
eration’s phenotypes without affecting their genotypes (Badyaev
and Uller, 2009; Danchin et al., 2011).
CONSEQUENCES FOR HEREDITY
It appears evident even from this limited survey that the con-
sequences of epigenetics for the notion of biological inheritance
are profound. By challenging the idea that heredity is the mere
transmission of nuclear DNA, epigenetics has opened the doors
to a broader, extended view of heredity by which information is
transferred from one generation to the next by many interact-
ing inheritance systems (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005). Epigenetic
variations act as a parallel inheritance system through which the
organism can respond in a more flexible and rapid way to envi-
ronmental cues and transmit to different cell lineages different
“interpretations” of DNA information (ibid.).
It is no longer the mere DNA sequence that is transferred inter-
generationally, but, expanding on the notions of “ontogenetic
niche” coined in the 1980s (West and King, 1987), it is the whole
“developmental niche” (Stotz, 2008), “the set of environmental
and social legacies that make possible the regulated expression of
the genome during the life cycle of the organism” (Griffiths and
Stotz, 2013: 110). Taking seriously the idea of a developmental
niche as the proper integrative framework for extended inher-
itance, as Griffiths and Stotz (2013) claim, means also under-
standing that environmental and social factors, not only merely
“genetic” factors, “carry information in development” (ibid.: 179).
The environment is therefore now seen as directly inducing
variations in evolution (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005), and its role
as “initiator of evolutionary novelties” clearly recognized (see also
Pigliucci, 2001; West-Eberhard, 2003; Pigliucci and Muller, 2010).
In sum, the narrow, gene-centric view of inheritance that was
at the core of the Modern Synthesis in evolutionary thinking
has been profoundly challenged and opened to a plurality of
different non-genetic mechanisms (Bonduriansky, 2012; Bon-
duriansky and Day, 2009; Uller, 2013). By inviting one to think
that “heredity involves more than genes”, and that “new inherited
variations (. . .) arise as a direct, and sometimes directed, response
to environmental challenge” epigenetic inheritance seems close to
Lamarckian ideas of soft inheritance and inheritance of acquired
features (Jablonka and Lamb, 1995: 1; see also Jablonka and Lamb,
2005; Gissis and Jablonka, 2011), although clearly the interpre-
tation of epigenetics in such a broad and heterodox conceptual
framework remains debated and controversial.
WHERE EPIGENETICS MEETS NEUROSCIENCE
Some of the most influential studies that are behind the recent
surge of interest in epigenetics originate from or directly cut-
across neuroscience research. Epigenetic research offers a key
missing link in the dynamic interplay between experience and the
genome in sculpting neuronal circuits especially in critical period
of plasticity (Fagiolini et al., 2009). It attempts to make visible
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the molecular pathway that explain how transient environmental
factors can lead “long-lasting modifications of neural circuits and
neuronal properties” (Guo et al., 2011).
The porousness of the brain to social signals has been at the
core of social neuroscience since its beginning in the 1990s. I will
focus here on three streams of research that have played a crucial
role in taking this openness and plasticity of the social brain to
a new level. Epigenetics in this sense can be seen as the climax
of that very visible process of the “socialization” of biological
and neurobiological concepts that we have witnessed in action in
evolutionary thinking since at least the 1990s (Meloni, 2014).
MOLECULAR PATHWAYS OF MATERNAL CARE IN THE BRAIN
In current epigenetic studies the story of how Michael Meaney,
a neuroscientist and clinical psychologist at McGill, and Moshe
Szyf, a molecular biologist and professor of pharmacology at the
same McGill, met in a bar during a conference in Spain, has
been told many times ( Buchen, 2010; Hoag, 2011) to show the
almost serendipitous encounter of a neurobiological perspective
with a genetic one that is behind social epigenetic research. This
interdisciplinary approach lies at the very core of Meaney’s group’s
maternal care studies on the intergenerational transmission of
stress and inadequate mothering in rodents (Meaney, 2001b),
amongst the most known in all the epigenetic literature (along
with Waterland and Jirtle’s studies on agouti mice: Waterland
and Jirtle, 2003, 2004). Also the story of how this study was first
rejected by Science and Nature is told to illustrate the impervious
terrain that marked the beginning of epigenetic research.
Meaney et al.’s study, finally published as Epigenetic program-
ming by maternal behavior in Nature Neuroscience (Weaver et al.,
2004) has become a massively quoted article (with more than 2500
citations), almost an icon of the new linkage between behavioral
exposures (in this case: maternal care and neonatal handling) and
genetic expression/development in the brain.
The basic findings of the study are that increased licking and
nursing activity by rat mothers altered the offspring DNA methy-
lation patterns in the hippocampus, thus affecting “the devel-
opment of hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal responses to stress
through tissue-specific effects on gene expression” (Weaver et al.,
2004: 847). Even more interestingly, cross-fostering pups of non-
caring mothers to affective ones, the DNA methylation phenotype
reflected that of the foster mother and was maintained stably into
adulthood thus shaping life-long behavioral trajectories.
This direct linkage between maternal care and neurological
development (via DNA methylation) was conceptualized in terms
of environmental (or epigenetic) programming that is a stable
non-sequence based modification (Francis et al., 1999) of gene
expression that proceeds without germline transmission. Another
take-home message of Meaney’s group study is the emphasis on
a critical period, the first week of life, for the effects of early
experience on methylation patterns in the hippocampus. Epige-
netic modifications are stably encoded during early life experi-
ences becoming therefore the critical factor in “mediating the
relationship between these experiences and long-term outcomes”
(Fagiolini et al., 2009). The sustained effects of these cellular
modifications “appear to form the basis for the developmental
origins of vulnerability to chronic disease” (Meaney et al., 2007).
STIGMAS OF TRAUMA IN THE BRAIN
But what about epigenetic research involving more specifically
humans? In 2009, another study appeared with a significant
impact on the field of social epigenetic. The research, originating
again from Meaney’s lab, focused on the level of DNA methylation
in postmortem hippocampal tissue from two groups of suicide
victims (using samples from the Quebec Suicide Brain Bank), one
of which with a history of abuse (McGowan et al., 2009).
The study found higher levels of DNA methylation of the
regulatory region of the glucocorticoid receptor (resulting in
decreased levels of glucocorticoid receptor mRNA) in the abused
group compared to the nonabused and the control group. Early
life adversities therefore (childhood abuse), not suicide per se, are
the key factors to explain the alteration of DNA methylation in
crucial genomic regions (neuron-specific glucocorticoid receptor
gene, NR3C1) in the brain.
This work, which translates Meaney’s research into human
studies for the first time, is consistent with the findings of the
studies on rodents and has been welcomed as biological evidence
of how traumatic life experiences become embedded in the
“memory” of the organism, getting “under the skin” (Hyman,
2009).
The findings of this research, along with others of McGowan
et al. (2008), are consistent with the non-human animal studies
of Meaney’s group about the emphasis on early life events as a
critical period for the establishment of stable DNA methylation
patterns, and therefore different pathways of neural development.
As the study claims: “early life events can alter the epigenetic state
of relevant genomic regions, the expression of which may con-
tribute to individual differences in the risk for psychopathology”
(McGowan et al., 2009: 346).
Like in Meaney’s group previous studies, the emphasis is on
the effects of disruption of parental care on methylation levels in
critical areas of the brain implicated in the regulation of responses
to stress and anxiety disorders. More importantly, the study aims
to open up important connections between variations in DNA
methylation in the hippocampus and the emergence of psychi-
atric disorders, a topic that is becoming increasingly relevant in
epigenetic research (see for instance Tsankova et al., 2007; Nestler,
2009), as it can be seen from the third and final cluster of what can
be named “epigenetic neuroscience” research.
NEUROEPIGENETICS: MECHANISMS OF PLASTICITY FOR
THE ADULT BRAIN
A final and parallel development at the crossroads of epigenetics
and neuroscience comes from the newborn sub-field of (cogni-
tive) neuroepigenetics (Day and Sweatt, 2011; Sweatt, 2013) that
focuses on how epigenetic mechanisms impact the adult brain and
the central nervous system.
Neuroepigenetics aims to investigate changes in epigenetic
marks that accompany neuronal plasticity and the processes of
learning and memory formation/maintenance in the brain (see
also Levenson and Sweatt, 2005; Borrelli et al., 2008). In a sense,
epigenetic marking itself can be seen as a “persistent form of
cellular memory” by which memories of past environmental
events are fixed on the genome. This would explain, it has
been claimed, the fact that the nervous system has co-opted
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 309 | 4
Meloni The social brain meets the reactive genome
this mechanism “to subserve induction of synaptic plasticity,
formation of memory and cognition in general” (Levenson and
Sweatt, 2006). Another task of neuroepigenetics is the under-
standing how epigenetic mechanisms may vary depending on the
different neural circuits and behavioral tasks involved (Day and
Sweatt, 2011). The main difference compared to the other studies
highlighted in this section is the emphasis on the adult brain.
Here, given the non-divisibility of adult neuron cells, epigenetic
tags although long-lasting are non-heritable, thus setting “the
roles of epigenetic mechanisms in adult neurons apart from
their roles in developmental biology” (Sweatt, 2013: 627). The
term neuroepigenetics is what distinguishes therefore this specific
aspect of epigenetic research from other areas of developmental
biology (Day and Sweatt, 2011). A new wave of publications on
the epigenetics of the adult brain illustrates well the high expec-
tations surrounding epigenetic knowledge to explain the molec-
ular mechanisms of plasticity. In a recent article, for instance,
Woldemichael et al. (2014) look at the way epigenetic processes
may subserve brain plasticity in relation to, amongst other things,
drug addiction and cognitive dysfunctions (age-associated cog-
nitive decline, Alzheimer’s disease, etc.). Moreover, they do so
always with an eye to the potential of epigenetic therapies to
reverse neurodegenerative disorders (see also Gapp et al., 2014).
Other recent publications in the field examine the epigenetics
of stress vulnerability and resilience (see also Stankiewicz et al.,
2013; Zannas and West, 2014), neuropsychiatric disorders (Hsieh
and Heisch, 2010), major psychosis (Labrie et al., 2012), autism
spectrum disorders (Ptak and Petronis, 2010), mood disorders
(Fass et al., 2014); again, with an eye to the development of novel
therapeutics.
Although many of these publications reflect very early
attempts to use epigenetic knowledge to explain the molecular
mechanisms of brain plasticity, and although in much of this
literature the supposed distinctiveness of epigenetic changes in
the brain rather than in other organs is never really problema-
tized, it is still helpful to survey this emerging literature as an
illustration of the current process of rewriting, in epigenetic
terms, of many themes from the last decade of research about
the social brain, particularly its plasticity and permeability to
environmental signals. Epigenetics in this sense can be seen as
the last frontier in the construction of the narrative about the
sociality of the brain, the discovery of a possible crucial mechanism
mediating between environmental exposures, gene expression
and neuronal development, that is likely to validate and give
further strength, at the molecular level, to many of the intuitions
that have been at the core of social neuroscience research since
the 1990s.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL THEORY
In the last two decades of research in cognitive science, mind
and cognition have been understood increasingly as an extended,
enacted and embodied phenomena (Clark and Chalmers, 1998;
Thompson, 2007; Clark, 2008; Noë, 2009; Menary, 2010).
Neuroscience has joined this trend: the brain has ceased to be
represented as an isolated organ and instead become a multiply
connected device profoundly shaped by environmental influ-
ences. One of the membranes demarcating the biological from the
social, the skull (Hurley in Noë, 2009), has been made increasingly
permeable to a two-way interaction.
The brain is increasingly thought of as a tool specifically
designed to create social relationships, to reach out for human
relationships and company, literally made sick by loneliness
and social isolation (Cacioppo and Patrick, 2008; Hawkley and
Cacioppo, 2010). The emergence of this novel language certifies to
the success of a discipline like social neuroscience (Matusall et al.,
2011), with its landscape populated by empathic brains and moral
molecules, mirror neurons and plastic synapses.
However, in the context of this trend toward an increasing
openness of the biological to social signals, the rise of molecular
epigenetics promises to bring this discourse to an entirely new and
more powerful level. Undoubtedly, this promissory vocabulary,
which has always been part of the rhetoric of the life-sciences
(as highlighted by a consistent body of scholarship in Science
and Technology Studies), has not to be taken at face value.
The “economy of hope” that surrounds epigenetics as a possible
relaunch of the genomics discourse is in particular something that
deserves critical scrutiny (Meloni and Testa, in press). However,
the appreciation of this more critical moment, cannot become a
reason to deny the potential contained in the epigenetic discourse,
especially when conceptualized in more sophisticated non gene-
centric frameworks (Griffiths and Stotz, 2013).
When compared with recent arguments about the sociality of
the brain, epigenetics seems to play a twofold function. Epige-
netics not only supplements social neuroscience by highlighting
the molecular mechanisms that orchestrate brain plasticity and
memory formation, but also seeks to blur any residual distinc-
tion between biology and social/ecological contexts. If the first
model of the cognitive brain was that of a computing machine,
entirely severed from environmental influences, and the brain
of social neuroscience still oscillated between plastic change and
hardwiring metaphors, with the rise of what can be named the
“epigenetic brain” or neuroepigenetics research the reciprocal
penetration of the social and the biological reaches a point where
trying to establish any residual distinction seems increasingly a
meaningless effort.
Particularly when conceptualized within theoretical
frameworks like Developmental Systems Theory (Oyama,
2000a[1985],b; Oyama et al., 2001) and other postgenomics
approaches, epigenetic research illustrates exemplarily how
we are moving toward a post-dichotomous view of biosocial
processes that research in social neuroscience was only partially
able to anticipate. With the rise of molecular epigenetics, the
biological is opened to environmental influences, to social
factors, and to the marks of personal experience like never before.
The sovereign role of the gene has been decentralized (Van
Speybroeck, 2002) and the genome made a “reactive genome”
(a term first coined by Gilbert, 2003, and expanded on more
recently by Keller, 2011; Griffiths and Stotz, 2013).
At the same time the notion of vitality has been expanded
to a new range of actors and “democratized” (Landecker and
Panofsky, 2013). In epigenetic research, the “social” seems to
assume a causative role in human biology to a degree unseen
before (Landecker and Panofsky, 2013). The same emergence of
a new terminology of “social and environmental programming”
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 309 | 5
Meloni The social brain meets the reactive genome
reflects this unprecedented prominence of the social level. Such
a discourse was quite unimaginable under the Weismannian’s
conception of an impenetrable barrier between soma and germ-
line, as well in what can be seen as the molecular translation of
Weismann’s argument (Griesemer, 2002) in the so-called Central
Dogma of Molecular biology (Crick, 1958) which stated the strict
one-side flow of information from DNA to RNA. In reversing the
informational asymmetry between genotype and phenotype, in
stressing the relevance of context (interpretation) upon the level
of DNA information (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005; Jablonka and
Raz, 2009) and finally in giving a life-span to genetic process,
making them radically dependent on temporal factors (Landecker
and Panofsky, 2013), epigenetics displays unique features that
promise to radically change the language of biology and, as a
consequence, the system of rules that have so far regulated the
biology/society boundary.
On one level, this unprecedented porousness of the biological
to the social comes as a good news for social scientists with an
interest in notions of embodiment and in exploring the pathways
through which the social shapes and is literally inscribed into the
body. The investigation of the ways in which social structures
and socio-economic differences literally get under the skin (and in
the brain), affecting the deep recesses of human physiology, has
always been an important concern of sociological theory, from
the French doctor and economist René Villermé and Friedrich
Engels in the 1800s (see Krieger and Davey Smith, 2004), to social
epidemiologists (Krieger, 2001, 2004, 2011; Shaw et al., 2003;
Krieger and Davey Smith, 2004) and neuroscientists (Lupien et al.,
2000; Noble et al., 2005, 2007, 2012; Farah et al., 2006; Kishiyama
et al., 2009; Hackman et al., 2010; Rao et al., 2010) in the early
twenty-first.
However, given the epistemological and political implications
of gene-centrism and the mainstream view of biology as an
unchangeable form of secular destiny in the twentieth-century,
these more plastic biosocial approaches have remained so far
exceptions (Boas, 1910 research on the changing bodily form
of immigrants and their descendants in the USA, being one of
these exceptions). Under these unfavourable epistemic circum-
stances, the possibility of sophisticated and enriching biosocial
explorations has been profoundly limited and mostly faced with
skepticism by social theorists. To import the biological into the
social, across the twentieth century, meant almost exclusively
refer to unacceptable class, race or gender biased explanations.
Facing this view of biology, disembodied social constructionist
explanations that rejected biology entirely seemed (almost) the
only way out for social scientists.
However, in the present scenario marked by the rise of epige-
netics and the new social biology, this marginalization no longer
seems compulsory for social scientists. Undoubtedly, epigenetics
is likely to revitalize a social science approach interested in how
“phenomena of the outside (. . ..) undergo transformations and
are incorporated to re-appear or be reproduced on the inside”
(Beck and Niewöhner, 2006: 224; Niewöhner, 2011; Guthman
and Mansfield, 2012). It may supplement various findings from
medicine, neuroscience, and various animal studies on the way in
which social phenomena (social position, socio-economic status
(SES), social isolation, rank, stress, etc.) are translated into the
body and affect human health. On these novel bases, a fresh dialog
between social and biological disciplines in which epigenetics
can penetrate the “sometimes obdurate wall between the life and
social sciences” (Landecker and Panofsky, 2013: 2) seems more
realistic than in the past (Rose, 2013; Meloni, 2013b, 2014).
On the other level, however, a recognition of the great potential
of epigenetic research to reframe and go beyond the sterile
nature/nurture opposition, is no reason to deny the ambigu-
ities and contradictory claims aligning in the field, and the
difficult methodological and epistemic questions still awaiting
to be answered before any major biosocial synthesis may be
proposed.
Even leaving aside hypes and controversies surrounding epi-
genetics, social scientists and theorists need to be aware that an
entire new array of problems is emerging in the postgenomic
scenario. This new complex of social problems does not derive
from the dichotomous separation of biological and social causes
in which the biological is supposed to have a causal primacy (as in
the hostile post 1970 debates on sociobiology, genetic reduction-
ism, or evolutionary psychology). Rather they arise for the exact
opposite reason, that is, because of the inextricable mixture of social
and biological factors typical of the epigenetics and postgenomic
conceptual landscape.
There is a specific and in a way unprecedented profile of
problems in the postgenomic age (Meloni, 2013b, 2014; Meloni
and Testa, in press) that without any ambition to be conclusive
I will try to sketch below. Rather than as consolidated analyses
of what is likely to happen in the epigenetic era, though, these
different clusters of problems can be read as preliminary questions
for a possible agenda of the social studies of the life-sciences in the
future years.
POSTGENOMIC EPISTEMOLOGY: MOLECULARIZING NURTURE?
Epigenetic research undermines the nature/nurture opposition
on both sides of the dichotomy. To the extent that genes are
now “defined by their broader context”, our understanding of
nature becomes less essentialist and “more epigenetic” (Griffiths
and Stotz, 2013: 228), that is, always entangled with social and
environmental factors. However the epistemic conditions for
environmental, social or experiential factors to become readable
in the epigenetic paradigm is their translation into signals at the
molecular level (Landecker, 2011). This trend finds confirmation
in the fact that different social categories (from race to class), and
environmental factors (from maternal care, to food and toxins)
are being increasingly conceptualized today in molecular terms
(Landecker, 2011; Niewöhner, 2011).
Only to the extent that our understanding of nurture becomes
more “mechanistic” (Griffiths and Stotz, 2013: 5) can we therefore
find a solution to the nature/nurture conundrum in the postge-
nomic era. It is important to notice here that mechanisms are
understood by Griffiths, Stotz and other philosophers of biology
not as a vulgar reductionist concept but as a more sophisti-
cated, multilevel, and emergentist notion which includes looking
“upward to higher levels” (Bechtel, 2008: 21) as well as making
room for the active, autonomous role of human agency.
This new version of mechanism, as Griffiths and Stotz again
claim, is producing an unexpected rapprochement with themes
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from the holistic tradition, or as they prefer “integrationist”
(ibid.: 103).
Nonetheless, although social scientists will recognize in this
anti-reductionist rethinking of the notion of mechanism an
appealing theoretical move, two sources of skepticism remain
to be addressed: (1) that in spite of the many sophistications
of philosophers of science and biology, the bulk of epigenetic
research will much more naively try to do business as usual,
inscribing the effects of complex social phenomena at the digi-
talized level of methylation marks (Meloni and Testa, in press),
with serious risk of over-simplification as well as attributing
causal relevance to random biological processes; and (2) that
mainstream social theory will remain not convinced by any idea
of the tractability of social and cultural phenomena, given the
legacy of traditions (from Weberian neo-Kantism to Durkheim,
from Western Marxism to Boasian anthropology: Benton, 1991;
Meloni, 2011, 2014) that made anti-naturalism and the incom-
mensurable nature of social and cultural processes the hallmark
of social research.
Given these opposite limitations, complex biosocial and bio-
cultural approaches are likely to remain a minority strategy,
caught between persisting reductionist tendencies in bioscience
and the continuing legacy of bio-phobia in social theory.
POSTGENOMIC BIOPOLITICS: “UPGRADE YOURSELF” OR BORN
DAMAGED FOR EVER?
The epigenome is caught in a curious dialectic of stability
and modifiability (Meloni and Testa, in press). Whereas genetic
sequences are fixed and unchangeable, epigenetic marks are at
the same time “long lasting” but “potentially reversible” (Weaver
et al., 2005; McGowan and Szyf, 2010). In its social dimension,
the plasticity of the epigenome, just like the plastic brain which
Catherine Malabou (2008) has written about, can be understood
in two alternative ways: (i) passively, as a capacity to receive form:
the epigenome, in contrast to genes, is vulnerable to environmen-
tal insults; (ii) actively, as a capacity to give form: the epigenome
can change and upgrade, through diet, exercise, therapeutic and
social manipulations.
In the wider society, this dialectic within the language of epi-
genetics is likely to become even more amplified as an oscillation
between determinism and hopes of individual/social ameliora-
tion: (i) determinism, because of the concerns that social and
environmental insults can leave indelible scars on the body and
brain (“Babies born into poverty are damaged forever before
birth” titled the UK newspaper The Scotsman (Mclaughlin, 2012),
to comment on a research on levels of methylation amongst
different social groups in Glasgow, of which more below); (ii)
amelioration, because the upgradable epigenome may become the
basis for a new motivation to intervene, control and improve it
through pharmacological agents or social interventions.
On the first dimension, political theorists and bioethicists have
already started to reflect upon the “collective responsibility” to
protect the vulnerable epigenome (Dupras et al., 2012; Hedlund,
2012) while legal theorists are speculating on the “number of
novel challenges and issues” that epigenetic transgenerational
effects may represent as a new possible “source of litigation and
liability” (Rothstein et al., 2009: 37). The transmissibility via the
epigenome of the insults of the past into the bodies of present
or future generations raises therefore novel issues of intergenera-
tional equity. This possible moralization of behaviors around the
vulnerable epigenome is having a particularly visible example on
the overwhelmingly centrality of the maternal body as a target of
responsibility for harmful epigenetic consequences on the child’s
health (Richardson, in press).
The second pole of this dialectic of plasticity, is instead
represented by the many injunctions (it is enough to surf the
web for some minutes to find many examples) to “upgrade”,
“improve”, “train” or “change your epigenome”. The possibility
of influencing the epigenome through diet, lifestyle, physical
activity, stress, tobacco, alcohol, and pharmacological interven-
tion becomes the likely basis for new forms of “therapeutic
manipulations” (McGowan and Szyf, 2010). In David Shenk’s
recent The Genius in All of Us one can see iconically the mobi-
lization of epigenetics, celebrated as a “new paradigm” and “the
most important discovery in the science of heredity since the
gene” (Shenk, 2010: 129), at the service of a view of unlim-
ited plasticity and constant struggle to enhance our capacity to
reach talent and brilliance (see for a comment, Papadopoulos,
2011).
Which of the two poles of this dialectic of plasticity is going to
prevail in the representation of epigenetics in the wider society,
and in the shaping of epigenetic science itself, remains an open
question. Science and society are constantly co-produced: this
two-way interaction seems particularly visible in epigenetic
research, thus representing a great opportunity to make of this
newly emerging discipline a theoretical spyglass to observe
the vivid emergence of the tensions and complexities of the
postgenomic age.
POSTGENOMIC SOCIAL POLICIES?
The increasing emphasis on the biological embedding of life’s
adversities at the genomic level is bringing to public attention
what has been called a new “biology of social adversity” (Boyce
et al., 2012). Epigenetic mechanisms are a major part of this
novel approach. Epigenetics has already been used in the service
of explaining the persistent nature, within specific groups, of
“connections that have previously been hard to explain” (Lan-
decker, 2011), particularly the perpetuation of health disparities
between the rich and the poor, between and within countries
(Vineis et al., 2013). An important trend is the use of epigenetic
and developmental findings in the so-called early-intervention
programmes (Shonkoff et al., 2009).
Over the last few years, a new array of studies has started to
look at the way in which social influences can become embodied
via epigenetic mechanisms and have lifelong and even inter-
generational effects (Miller et al., 2009; Wells, 2010; Borghol
et al., 2012). Kuzawa and Sweet (2009) study on racial disparities
in cardiovascular health in the USA is a major example of the
reconfiguration of the relationship between biological and social
factors brought about by epigenetics. This work has focused on
epigenetic and other developmental mechanisms as the missing
link between early life environmental factors (e.g., maternal stress
during pregnancy) and adult race-based health disparities in
“hypertension, diabetes, stroke, and coronary heart disease”. It is
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an important attempt to rethink race along a different, somatic
and socio-cultural together, line of thought.
In the UK, the study of McGuinness et al. (2012) on the
correlation between SES and epigenetic status (variations in the
level of methylation) between socio-economically deprived and
more affluent groups in Glasgow (but also between manual and
non-manual workers) points more empirically to an association
between social neglect, poverty, and “aberrant” levels of methy-
lation. “Global DNA hypomethylation” the study claims “was
associated with the most deprived group of participants, when
compared with the least deprived”. Epigenetic markers are used in
this and other studies as a “bio-dosimeter” (ibid., 157) to measure
the impact of social adversity on lifestyle and disease susceptibility
(see also: Landecker and Panofsky, 2013).
Looking at the past two decades of attempts to use genetics
and neuroscience in the public arena as the ultimate bastion of
evidence for social deprivations and inequalities, it is possible
that epigenetic findings will become increasingly relevant in
social policy strategies. How these findings will help convince
policy-makers of the “non-ethereal” nature of environmental
influences in order to make “more effective arguments” about the
biological impact of social forces (Miller, 2010), and influence
specific political agendas (as seen in the notion of neuropolicy,
see Racine et al., 2005) is difficult to foresee at this stage. It is clear
however that the seductive appeal of neurobiological explanations
(Wastell and White, 2012) is likely to be amplified further when
combined with the seductive appeal of epigenetics, where social
differences and environmental insults are expected now to be
seen literally “imprinted on DNA”.
It is important however to remember the huge gap existing
between public sensationalism, especially in its public health
implication, and the cautious takes of the experts (Feil and Fraga,
2012; Meloni and Testa, in press). Even more ambiguously, the
emergence of a possible discourse that identifies, at the local level,
subgroups with abnormal epigenetic marks (reflecting the perpet-
uation of historically disadvantageous conditions) may create a
whole new set of social and public policy questions. The legacy of
soft or Lamarckian inheritance in social policy discourses has not
always been particularly progressive (Bowler, 1984), and its pos-
sible returning appeal today should become a matter of reflection
for social scientists (Meloni and Testa, in press). Moreover, there is
increasing concern among social scientists that constructs rather
widespread in epigenetics and DOHaD literature, from “maternal
capital” (Wells, 2010) to the growing emphasis on maternal
behaviors and the maternal body as the “vector” through which
epigenetic patterns are established in early life (as highlighted by
Richardson, in press), could have problematic effects on public
health strategies and moral reasoning about families, parenting,
and women in particular.
CONCLUSION
In spite of my emphasis on some ambiguities of epigenetic
research, the most important lesson for social scientists and
theorists at this stage is probably that the future and therefore
the social meaning of postgenomics and epigenetics is not already
written. As Michel Morange (2006: 356) has claimed some years
ago: “the very fashionable post-genomic programs can have very
different stakes, some reductionist and other holistic, depending
upon who is supporting them. The current state of biological
research is very contrasted, because biology is hesitating at a cross-
roads between reductionism and holism”. It is therefore too early
to say if molecular epigenetics will become mired in another form
of reductionism (Lock, 2005) or will join new exciting theoretical
collaborations capable to “transcend the divide between ‘nature’
and ‘nurture’ intellectually and methodologically” (Singh, 2012).
Epigenetics is not set in stone, but an open field where theoretical
debates and critiques are vital (Landecker and Panofsky, 2013).
Given the multiple and plastic nature of its same concept, at the
crossroads of different traditions and research-styles, epigenetics
will likely be a terrain for conceptual battle between different
stakeholders and intellectual agendas. This is probably one further
reason for social scientists to be part of this debate from its very
beginning.
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